Western Democracy VS Chinese Meritocracy

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Personal Intro

Preventing my baby boy from being suffocated and thrown off the balcony in the middle of the night, his mother from taking her life, begging doctors to give her Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT) to save her life, a botched treatment, post-traumatic stress and twice hospitalized first for a stroke and then a heart attack, it wasn’t until I moved and found myself immersed in an utterly alien culture of caring and kindness, that I began to heal, after 17 years in the individualistic West.

In a disconnected world, re-discovering ourselves is its own journey, but what if the journey isn’t just about self-discovery but learning, for the first time, that what you assumed about “the other” wasn’t what you thought, but mind-bogglingly different than anything you could have possibly imagined?

Fascinated by difference and complexity, my hunger to make sense is unrelenting. Returning to teach for the third time, this time in Shandong Province, the birthplace of Confucius, a recent cycling trip forced me to make sense of another incongruity: that China’s authoritarian system might be more citizen-centred than the democratic system I grew up with; China had dumbfounded me once; maybe it would defy my assumptions about Western superiority a second time… 

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Research on how Asians and Westerners think differently clarifies why the West profoundly misunderstands China[i] and explains my bizarre experiences after moving to Nanjing, one of China’s four Great Ancient Capitals, eleven years ago. Whether I was greeted with “Welcome to China” everywhere I went like I was a guest of a small village, asked by strangers for selfies to show off their new “foreign friend”, told by a young male hairdresser how honored he was to cut my hair, KTV (karaoke bar) staff kowtowed, or complete strangers helped me order and eat in a cafeteria, with public transit or just daily life, China wasn’t just different; it was otherworldly. Though my ancestors go back thousands of years in the Anglo-Saxon West (England, New Zealand, Ireland, Scotland, and Germany), it took moving to China to get what I needed. Living in China saved me from losing faith in humanity. Perhaps the extreme isolation I had felt allowed me to “see” the deep humanity in another culture. All this made me deeply reflect, from the beginning, China’s utterly different civilizational roots compared to mine.

If the pandemic has taught us anything, we’re all connected. Marianne Williamson, New York Times bestselling author of A Return to Love suggests as much in her praise of famed Gabor Mate M.D. and son’s critique of the absence of links in the West between “the individual and the social and the emotional contexts within which our lives unfold, and health or illness ensue” (p.2) [ii] in the New York Times bestseller, The Myth of Normal: Trauma, Illness and Healing in a Toxic Culture. Mate and Mate (2022) go further and assert that a society that doesn’t value our need to care for each other or belong has lost touch with its humanity. China, in contrast, was unlike anything I could have imagined; the harmonious, status-oriented mindset permeated everything. But I shouldn’t have been surprised; this was consistent with what Chinese scholars had long been saying: that the Chinese have not radically changed their worldview in the 1800 years since the golden age of Chinese civilization (1099 B.C.E. to 221 C.E.) (Ruan 2021)[iii]. This short quote from a translated version of, Dongjing meng Hua lu (Dreams for Episodes of Splendour of the Eastern Capital)[iv], an authoritative book on affluent Chinese culture, where Meng Yuanlao (1187) describes the congenial nature of Chinese, especially towards strangers in the ancient capital of Kaifeng 900 years ago is but one example:

There was such happy times, so many people and an abundance of things in the shops, the wonderful festivals, so many sights for the eye to enjoy, above all, I remember the humane and congenial character of the citizens, always ready to help a stranger.

Yet, despite the West’s profound misunderstanding, after 200 years of dominance, it’s supreme confidence in the superiority of Western-style democracy over all other types of government in “delivering what citizens want”[v] continues. This is despite survey after survey in which a greater proportion of Chinese people have greater belief in the democracy in China than citizens in almost every Western country. Latana’s 2024 Democracy Perception Index [vi] (the world’s most extensive annual study on how people perceive democracy), for example, reveals that 79% of Chinese citizens believe China is “very democratic,” the third highest of any country. This contrasts with 57% of Americans who believe the US is “very democratic”. But, confronted with something that flew in the face of everything I had been conditioned to think, the issue faded from memory. However, a question still lingered: if Western democracy was so superior, why were so many in the West losing faith in it?

Questioning democracy

For years, I had normalized the uneasiness I would feel cycling in my hometown of Toronto after close calls with cars, trucks, and buses, yet I never lost faith in the superiority of Western democracy. But, after a recent cycling trip in Yantai (a lower-tier Chinese city), my faith was shaken when a bicycle sign above the lane ahead made it unmistakable: a lane solely dedicated to bicycles and e-bikes on an overpass appeared before me! The sense of safety was an out-of-body feeling! Never did I imagine the possibility in any first-world, Western democratic country, let alone China’s authoritarian system. The exhilarating feeling of being “seen” kept lingering.

I was in my 8th year of cycling in my 3rd Chinese city, so with years of Canadian cycling experience and a research background in governance, I was confronted by some challenging questions. How could a poorer city, in a third-world authoritarian country design infrastructure more perfectly suited to its citizen’s safety needs than a wealthy international city in an advanced, western democratic country? Weren’t democracies “by and for the people”? Weren’t authoritarian governments indifferent to their citizens? Yantai’s cycling paths were routed behind bus stops, and I later discovered car-wide lanes solely for bicycles and e-bikes went through Yantai’s many tunnels, too. The city government’s exceptional responsiveness to the safety needs of cyclists (apparently regardless of cost) projected a distinctly more generous feeling of humanity and caring than the democratically-elected city government in my hometown had ever given me.

China’s subway systems reflect its greater focus on the safety of its citizens, too. It would be impossible, for instance, to get hit by a subway train because platforms in every city I’ve visited are separated from trains by glass wall barriers with sliding glass doors that open only when trains are stopped. I have never seen such a focus on subway safety in any of the world’s democracies I’ve visited. China’s lack of homelessness compared to Canada, as an “advanced” developed country, is yet another example. Again, how could a so-called indifferent authoritarian government like China’s care more about the safety needs of its citizens than the Western democracy I grew up in and all the rich Western democracies I’d visited? I needed to investigate.

I discovered a TED talk by Eric Li. Eric, an investor and political scientist born in Shanghai at the height of the Cultural Revolution, tells us that a standard assumption in political science has been that, as society progresses, it eventually becomes a capitalist, multi-party democracy. But, in this boundary-pushing talk, Eric asks us to consider other ways to run a prosperous modern nation. 

China’s Political Meritocracy

Eric: “Now this may be counter-intuitive to you. The party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. China’s highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members. In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called Princelings. The other 20, including the president and the premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth, was even smaller. The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you’ll find the Party being near the top in upward mobility.” 

One of the “most meritocratic political systems in the world today” in a one-party state with only a tiny proportion of leaders coming from a background of wealth and privilege? How could this be? China’s meteoric rise was no longer a mystery. I was aware of China’s meritocratic system and its culture of work and competition, but only peripherally; but maybe that was enough. I’d heard many stories from students studying for an exam, whether to become a Communist Party of China member or primary or secondary school teacher, some of whom had been studying all day, every day, for months. But I didn’t appreciate the full extent of what’s become known as China’s “exam-driven educational fever”[vii] until I visited a local Buddhist temple during the annual gao kao, China’s world-famous three-day university entrance examination, and witnessed the deluge of red ribbons parents had hung up with their good wishes for their child’s success. The gao kao is so important, that construction sites pause their drilling and traffic police steer vehicles from test centers to maintain silence. A top score on the gao kao secures admission to a top-ranked Chinese university and a good job, which can lift students, their parents, and grandparents out of poverty and elevate their status within the community. This happened to a Chinese teacher I once worked with who is now completing his PhD.

Eric: “The question then is that how could that be possible in a system run by one party? Now we come to a powerful political institution, little known to Westerners: the party’s organization department. The department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations. It operates a rotating pyramid made up of three components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a community program. They form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom called “keyuan” (clerk). Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks; fuke (Deputy Section Manager, ke (Section Manager), fuchu (Deputy Division Manager), chu (Division Manager). Now these are not moves from Karate Kid okay? Its serious business. The rank of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a company. Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates. They vet their personal conduct. They conduct public opinion surveys and they promote the winners.”

I concur with the thoroughness of the government’s performance reviews since, over the past year, I’ve had to complete opinion surveys evaluating my boss’s performance at the university and Yantai city’s amenities, the latter involving questions regarding the quality and prevalence of English on signs and whether they were sufficient. Suddenly, the high caliber of Yantai’s cycling infrastructure made perfect sense; officials weren’t only upwardly, but downwardly, laterally and publicly, accountable, even to foreigners like me. It took a bit of reflection to take it all in but once it dawned on me that this was likely going on with every bureaucrat who dealt with anything directly related to the public, I realized every citizen can likely review a local bureaucrat’s performance any day, almost like a kind of “government by and for the people” you could say. Clearly, “authoritarian” China’s bureaucrats are not nearly as remote from the citizens they serve as bureaucrats in the West where performance evaluations are limited to being exclusively upwardly accountable to their superiors. This is presumably why Western bureaucrats are generally viewed as remote and power-hungry and known to create their own fiefdoms. This level of public influence on China’s government is difficult for a Westerner to imagine, where “performance evaluations” are of politicians who are assumed to have control over the bureaucracies they are responsible for and occur over a matter of years, where, in China, evaluation of government is ongoing.

Extracted from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0YjL9rZyR0%29

Democratization and Social Mobility

But none of this is new, China’s meritocratic system has existed, at least, since the Sui Dynasty (581–618) and is rooted in Confucian thinking and, except for a period after the fall of the Qing Dynasty (1636–1912), has existed in China for 1400 years! Consequently, for centuries, China’s meritocracy has been refined to maximize the chance ability, not class or position, determine success. This takes us to Adel Aali and his interview with Dr. Yasheng Huang, professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Sloan School of Management and author of The Rise And Fall of the EAST, who introduces us to the history of meritocracy’s impacts on Chinese society on his History Behind News podcast.

Adel Aali: “Doctor Huang, in the last segment, we talked about exams in China and how, they started back in the sixth century. Did I get the period correct?” 

Dr. Yasheng Huang: “Yeah, yeah. Century, late sixth century.”

Adel Aali: “What I’m what I’m wondering is what was the motivation behind this as you as you described it well, this was way ahead of anything that Europe did for its administration. So how did China come up with this?”

Dr. Yasheng Huang: “So that’s that’s an issue, I have to say, I don’t really know because you’re talking about motivation. And, by the way, the sixth century version is a sort of a systematic version of previous versions that were ad hoc, haphazard, irregular. So, the dating of it goes even further than the sixth century.”

Adel Aali: “Oh, wow. So in the 6th century they sort of organized it, institutionalized it, if you will.”

Dr. Yasheng Huang: “That’s exactly institutionalization of it.”

Adel Aali: “Oh, wow.”

Dr. Yasheng Huang: “So, before it sort of existed here and there, was oral exam, not written exam. And it was, it was sequential. So you first got recommendations and then you test it, people who already got a positive recommendation. Whereas in the sixth century they began to expand the eligibility. Right. They scaled it to the, almost the entire male population beyond the elite I mean, again, that process took a couple of hundred years to complete. In the ancient times, the system didn’t move very fast in terms of why I have to say, I don’t know. I know the exam system proved to be beneficial to the autocrats.”

Dr. Huang describes the gradual process through which the elite’s formerly privileged eligibility to write the government exam (by getting “recommended” first) eroded until the end of the sixth century when it was extended to almost all males based on merit. Initially, the exam had also been oral, presumably due to the nobility’s resistance to transparency and threat to their power. However, this also changed when the exam became written.

Adel Aali: “To the autocrats, not to the state in general?”

Dr. Yasheng Huang: “No that’s a good way of looking at this. It was also good to the system as far as the autocrats constituted a major part of the system. Essentially it contributed to autocratic stability and, if you look at the data on the duration of the rulers, they increased after they introduced the exam, and the length of the dynasty also increased somewhat, not as much as the duration of the rulers, but that also increased. Also, China became a unified country after the 6th century. Before the 6th century, there were periods of unification but there was also a long period of disunity. After that, 600, basically China remained unified, except for a short period of time, but majority of that time period is a unified country. China today is a unified autocracy, so it promoted the duration of the ruler’s rule, it promoted the longevity of the system, it promoted the unification of the country.”

Adel Aali: “As I was reading some of your essays, and watching some of your prior interviews, two things that stuck out for me when it came to these exams. I’ve actually read books about this, and this is a vast subject of how these came about. But one of the things that I realized is that… unlike Europe, Chinese monarchs, emperors were sort of surrounded by people that were not in the elite, that were not, let me correct that, that were not born into the elite class, that’s the difference. Yeah. And it’s this was sort of subtle. It took me a while to catch up to this. Uh, is my assessment correct here?”

Dr. Yasheng Huang: “Your assessment is absolutely correct. And there’s, I’m writing another book with a co-author of mine, Clare Young. We have data to show after the exam was introduced in sixth century, the people around the emperor, the people around the autocrat, became even more of a commoner background than before. Right, so the exam definitely tipped the balance in favor of those people who hailed from humble backgrounds relative to born elites.”

Adel Aali: “That didn’t exist anywhere else. I mean, if you look at, I don’t know, in Middle East Europe, the kings and queens were surrounded by other nobility, born into nobility, right?”

Dr. Yasheng Huang: “Yeah, yeah, So to get back to the earlier question, you asked, Is China unique? Yeah, I would argue it is unique. Right. And the exam system was introduced so early and then it had this democratizing, democratization or democratizing effect in terms of mobility, upward mobility, right. So this is kind of a almost like a almost like the myth of American Dream, right?”

Adel Aali: “Yeah.”

Emperors “surrounded by people who were not in the elite”, whose duration and dynasty’s duration increased following the establishment of China’s meritocratic system? What? Here Dr. Huang and Adel Aali reveal how, with the erosion of the class system and enhanced social mobility over 1400 years, China’s unique meritocratic system created a more unified country, in sharp contrast to Europe[viii], where the class system at least up until colonization, continued as Britain’s class system solidified. China’s meritocracy democratized China and established social mobility reminiscent of the American dream hundreds of years before any Western democracy.

When asked how China originally devised its system, Dr Huang responds that he’s not sure but knows a less institutionalized version existed before the 6th century. This is correct; the idea of merit is rooted in the ancient concept of Shanrang, first conveyed in the famous legends of Yao and Shun, two sagely kings who lived 4,000 years ago [ix]. Shanrang was an abdication and succession system where a current ruler would voluntarily relinquish the throne and select a successor based on merit rather than blood. This brings us to the next clip from a History Hit TV documentary on Confucius. 

Narrator: “…Born around 551 BC, Confucius lived in an age of political chaos and war. At this time, China was divided into numerous states, each locked in a desperate and bloody

Battle for the domination of the country. 

Professor Michael Nylan, UC Berkeley: Confucius was born in an era when all he saw around him was continual warfare. One state fighting against another state. They’re 

assassinating rulers and extinguishing kingdoms as fast as they can…” 

Later known as The Spring and Autumn period, Confucius lived during the time of the Zhou dynasty’s diminishing authority when conflicts broke out between nobles before descending into 

all out war during the Warring States period that followed, a time with surprising similarities to the U.S.’s diminishing authority that we see today.

Narrator: “…Desperate to find a solution to the violence of his age. Confucius looked back to the past, in particular to the era of the early Zhou kings, who had ruled large parts of 

China 600 years before.

Dr. Jeffrey Riegel, University of Sydney: Many people, including Confucius, looked back to the Zhou as a golden age, as a time when rulers governed their people with virtue and 

kindness and compassion. 

Narrator: Unlike the political disorder of his own times. Confucius believed this was a period of peace and stability, thanks in large part to the ancient rites, customs, and etiquette

that bound Zhou Society together, a concept he called Li. 

Dr. Jeffrey Riegel, University of Sydney: Li reduced to basics is ceremony, ritual. It also refers to what we think of more generally as customs, social practices; what I say when I

greet an old friend, what I say when I express reverence for a teacher or a parent. Confucius pointed out how very important those customs and practices are as the glue of society, of

keeping us together….”

Professor Roger Ames, Hawaii University: “…What happened in this period was the beginning of the aestheticization of the human culture, lifting the human being out of our 

animality and making us into something that is elegant and enchanted. Confucius, at the beginning of a very troubled period, tried to re-establish this, the Li that that had faltered as 

China became increasingly involved in war. 

Narrator: If the ancestral rites aim for cosmic harmony. Confucius believed social harmony could be achieved by the reinforcement of the hundreds of smaller rituals that still govern 

Chinese life. From handshakes and greetings to the relationship between young and old, teacher and student, or husband and wife. 

Professor Daniel Bell, Tsinghua University: Tsinghua University: The aim of Li is to generate a sense of community and caring within the participants of that ritual. So you have 

rituals like group eating. You know, if you’re sitting with the family, the elder person usually eats first. So when you have drinking rituals, including the family and the teacher, the 

student is supposed to drink like this without facing the teacher. Their hierarchical rituals. So again, the ultimate purpose is to develop a sense of caring among the participants that 

would not otherwise be the case….”

Using Li to generate a sense of community and caring explains what I, as a Westerner, saw as otherworldly behaviour immediately after moving to China. Moving from a civilization that Mate and Mate [x] assert doesn’t value our need to care for each other or belong, especially when dealing with something as dark as my ex-wife’s chronic mental illness virtually alone, to a civilization that has been creating and promoting a community of caring for at least 1800 years, it’s no wonder why I didn’t begin to heal until I moved to China and my faith in humanity was renewed. But what does it say about the West’s long history of demonizing a civilization with so much humanity as alien?

Narrator: The traces of the sage paintings tell the story that threatened the rise of Confucius’s state under his guidance. The state of Qi hatched a plan that would have profound

consequences on his life. You are my tiger mother. According to legend, the State of Qi sent 120 of their finest horses and 80 of their most beautiful dancers to Liu Dinggong, the 

Duke of Lu. And the duke was so entranced he neglected the court rituals and sacred rites, and the Li of the state collapsed in just three days. 

Dr. Chenshan Tian, Beijing Foreign Studies University: This picture is very significant, very key. The turning point of his life. He tried a few times to, to persuade the Liu 

Dinggong, 

Dr. Chenshan Tian, Beijing Foreign Studies University: Please come back to taking care of the state affairs. Because he failed in persuading Liu Dinggong, there’s no hope for him

to stay on, so he got to find some other way, go somewhere to realize his will. 

Narrator: Despondent, Confucius decided to leave and, joined by a group of his most loyal disciples, he traveled across China’s war-torn states in an attempt to persuade other rulers 

to take on his ideas. 

Dr. Chenshan Tian, Beijing Foreign Studies University: On this trip, one thing he tried to practice his ideas to try to persuade all the kings to accept his philosophy, the way his 

ideas about how to govern a good society. They work together. They travel together. They help each other. They contribute their own ideas into a pool of rich philosophy. 

Narrator: This is one of the most famous periods of Confucius’s life. During the next 14 years, Confucius traveled back and forth between around eight of the smaller states in 

China’s central plains, spending years in some and just weeks in others. It was a long, arduous journey. Caught in the crossfire of states, at war, and without shelter or security, they’d 

be kidnapped, lose their way, and, on many occasions, even come close to death. 

Confucius’ “Junzi” and Roots of Political Meritocracy 

Narrator: The challenges they faced forced Confucius to refine and debate his philosophy. And it is during this time that he developed one of his most profound ideas the concept of 

the junzi, the morally noble or superior man.

Here the ancient concept of Shanrang, first made famous by emperors Yao and Shun 1000 years before the Zhou dynasty, is adapted by Confucius into the new idea of a “junzi”, a person of noble character who strives to extend the love and care they have for their family to the broader society.

Professor Daniel Bell, Tsinghua University: A junzi, normally translated as noble man or gentleman, but a better translation is exemplary person because whether it’s a man or 

woman, we should all strive to be a junzi, according to the Confucian tradition. Somebody who strives to be a junzi should try to extend the love and care beyond the family, should 

care about justice and morality, not about their own self-interest, first and foremost, and it’s a lifelong struggle, one that never ends. 

Narrator: Unlike the rulers of his own age who ruled by the sword, Confucius believed a true junzi ruled with virtue, putting his people’s well-being alongside his own.

Professor Xie Youtian, Szechuan University (translated): The principle question in politics is to retrain power. The kings had power and Confucianism has a whole set of thoughts 

to restrain the Kings. It is the Confucian political philosophy; the king should love his people as he loves his son.

Narrator: But Confucius also gave the word a radical new meaning before him. A junzi meant someone of noble blood after it meant someone not of noble blood, but of noble 

character.

Professor Jeffrey Riegel, University of Sydney: There’s something quite revolutionary in this. He’s inviting people to look beyond the trappings of power, to look beyond physical

attractiveness, to what we might say is an inner beauty; virtue ethics and the like. And so this is this is one of the one of the things I think, that he realized during this period of exile. 

Narrator: The best examples of Confucius’ reinterpretation of the word junzi are his disciples themselves. Drawn from every section of society, none were of noble birth, yet all 

had the innate potential to be noble of character. 

Professor Annping Chin, Yale University: Amongst his disciples they were all types. His disciple Zigong was a merchant. Zilu was a warrior type. And two of his favorite disciples,

yang Hui was from a commoners background, from a very, very poor family, and Zhong Gong was someone whose provenance was very questionable. I love Confucius description of 

Zhong Zhong. He said that it’s possible for a descendant of a plough, cattle, you know, to be born with perfectly formed horns. I think what all this tells us is that Confucius did not 

measure a person’s worth by way of that person’s family background. 

Professor Daniel Bell, Tsinghua University: At the time. Confucius was very concerned with training future generations so that they would be good and moral leaders. So this idea 

of what we can call political meritocracy, that the political system should be designed with the aim of selecting rulers with superior ability and virtue that’s central to the Analects of 

Confucius, and it’s very central to the whole Confucian tradition. 

It is difficult to imagine a better crucible for developing ideas to end war and build a good society than drawing from knowledge of the practices in a previous “golden age” that had already proven themselves hundreds of years before and combining that with directly interacting with rulers and kings of eight states during the greatest period of war in Chinese history (the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods) while debating with your most dedicated followers in the search for solutions, but, for fourteen years, this was the life of Confucius and his seven most dedicated followers. This led to the revolutionary concept of a “junzi”, the morally noble or superior man. Initially referring to a man with noble blood, “junzi” was redefined as a man of noble character. Once solely based on inheritance (family background), to be noble was now to refer to something earned (virtue and superior ability), demonstrated, at least for getting a government position, by success on a government “examination”, a term that didn’t exist in the class-based West until, at least, 2200 years later. Now we turn to “xiao”, or filial piety (respect for one’s elders), another concept from history made famous by Confucius.

Narrator: “…In Sima Qian’s biography, we are told that xiao came to Confucius naturally from an early age. Rather than playing with normal toys, Confucius spent his childhood staging elaborate ancestral rites, in particular for his father, who had died when he was just three. And as Confucius grew up, he realized that the values he found in the family, exemplified by the love one had for one’s parents and grandparents, could be extended outwards for the benefit of the rest of society. 

Professor Annping Chin, Yale University: These things should come naturally, I mean, it’s natural for the young to respect the older person, it’s natural in the village that the elderly actually get their share of food first. I think his genius is that he realized that there is a moral grounding to those practices. What was that moral grounding? It has to do with empathy. He thought of empathy is the one thing that distinguished humans from other animals, that if we are born with that sense, that sort of that stirring of empathy, why not expand it? Why not make it work for the family, for the community, for the state. 

Here we see how Confucius understood that moral values underpin practices learned while growing up in a family, like respect for one’s elders, love and empathy, and how they can be extended outwards to benefit the rest of society. For instance, playing a musical instrument wasn’t just about achieving expertise and showing off one’s talent but learning patience and using music to build harmony. Similarly, focusing on practices that built strong families wasn’t just about families but building strong communities and a vital state.

Narrator: “In 484 BC, after 14 long years on the road, Confucius abandoned politics and finally returned home. Unable to find any rulers to take on his ideas, instead, he decided to transfer his attention to the training of a new generation of junzi. 

Professor Annping Chin, Yale University: By that time, he was already 68, and once he was invited back to come to come home, then it was said that his gate was just flooded with young men who wanted to learn from him. And what exactly did they want to learn from him? I think it has to do with the art of government, because several of his chief disciples, they don’t actually became very important people in government. Zigong, for instance, served as a councillor and Zilu had a high political position. And there was Zhonggong was a an administrator. And so maybe these young men felt that Confucius could teach them something about statecraft, about the art of government, and also how to get into government. 

Narrator: To train this new generation, Confucius developed a curriculum based on the ancient teachings of the past. At its heart were the six arts; the six skills a junzi had to master in order to cultivate his character. They included Li (the rites) and yue (music), both of which brought harmony to society. And Confucius placed these alongside the essential skills of shufa (calligraphy), shuxue (mathematics), liuyi (charioteering), shejian (archery). Most importantly, it’s during this period that Confucius is said to have compiled and edited the most sacred books of Chinese history, which are now called the Five Classics. 

Narrator: Confucius Academy is the subject of one of the most well-known paintings in the traces of the sage series. It vividly shows the master and his disciples annotating and discussing the ancient literature. 

Dr. Chenshan Tian, Beijing Foreign Studies University: You see the people working on the classical texts, warm discussion, heated discussion, and here Confucius himself. 1234567, 8 people sitting around him, the master and disciples together develop new ideas. The younger generation is entirely involved in the discussion in the continuity of tradition. This is exactly reflect the idea and how Confucianism developed over history. 

Adapting traditional concepts to modern situations is central to the evolution of Chinese civilization and was key for Confucius, who revered history. Old ideas are not viewed as static and unchanging but are constantly readapted to new conditions so China’s so-called “Communism” can be viewed as a modern-day adaptation of China’s traditional authoritarian system. Veronique Nguyen, in “How Chinese Strategy Ate Western Strategy for Breakfast” further reinforces this idea in her description of how China used sixth-century military and political strategies to regain its place as a world leader[xi]. According to ancient Chinese philosophy, everything is in perpetual flux, so a situation’s hidden potential is more relevant than the present state of affairs, which will inevitably change. So when the 30^th stratagem advises to, “withdraw as a guest, return as a host”, the “guest” adopts a subordinate position, bringing down the defenses of the host, which enables the “guest” to nibble at the host’s foundations while patiently exploiting his weaknesses. The 17^th stratagem then suggests to, “toss out a brick to lure a jade gem” or throw a bait to your rival to make him drop his guard so he’s easily captured and his valuables seized. When China’s leaders downplayed China’s strengths and ambitions, exploited the greed of Western companies to conquer China’s market, and turned the West’s neoliberal ideology to their advantage, it was by using these two strategems. Consequently, the huge access to Western markets gained by China was never fully reciprocated, and profits made by a few of the West’s high-end companies (the “brick” of the stratagem) never compensated for the losses incurred in other sectors of Western economies (the “jade”). This was China’s response to its past humiliation when Western powers forced it to purchase British and American opium, taking advantage of its impoverished state. These are but two of the many strategems available to Chinese leaders that we could learn from instead of remaining in ignorance.

Narrator: The Five Classics were canonized alongside the Analects of Confucius during the Han Dynasty, over 600 years after his death. Erected by the emperor in the Imperial Academy, these sacred books then became the basis of China’s famous imperial examination system, a rigorous set of exams that were designed to root out the most talented candidates for imperial government.

Professor Jeffrey Riegel, University of Sydney: The examinations guaranteed candidates had read the classics and had understood the teachings of the sages, and if they understood those teachings, it was assumed they would be trusted advisers to the emperor and trusted officials throughout his realm. 

Narrator: Added to over the following centuries with books and commentaries by later disciples at the Imperial Academy in Beijing, this vast stone library covers 189 stone steles. With their 630,000 characters taking over four years to carve…” 

Professor Michael Nylan, UC Berkeley: “I think in all early civilizations, learning about one’s many pasts, not a single past is very important because past history provides precedents about what does work, how you motivate people, what you do in crises, how you resolve dilemmas. All of this is contained within the five Classics and the various Commentarial traditions. 

Narrator: The examinations themselves were famously rigorous. Candidates had to learn hundreds of thousands of passages from the classic texts, with question and answer sessions lasting over three days. Conducted at four different levels from the lowest level country exams to the final test at the Imperial Academy. The pass rate was only 1 or 2%. With such power and privilege awaiting the successful few. Some candidates even tried every method to succeed…” 

Narrator: “The influence of the imperial examination system was so enormous that it spread across Asia to Vietnam, Korea, and Japan. But perhaps its clearest legacy in modern China is the gao kao of the annual National University Entrance examinations, in which students from all walks of life attempt to win places not in government but at the nation’s best universities. As a mark of their debt to Confucius, one rite of passage for many students is a trip to the Imperial Academy in Beijing, where they ask for the blessing of China’s first and greatest sage.

Learning the Five Classics was the basis of China’s meritocracy for centuries. It resulted in China’s distinctive literati-official tradition in which power is institutionally inseparable from knowledge and led to political equality where everyone gained, through education, not only knowledge about Confucian ideas but equal opportunity, where the most talented were selected to run the bureaucracy. Chinese civilization was the only civilization that came up with the idea[xii]. This is why the Confucian system lies at the core of the longest-lasting political order in human history. Its influence went far beyond Asia [xiii] and was closely studied by the British, French, and, to a lesser extent, the Americans in the first half of the nineteenth century.

China’s Meritocracy and Britain’s Governance

The influence of China’s meritocratic system was so immense that one of the main reasons Thomas Taylor Meadows’ (Britain’s consul In Canton, China), published, Desultory Notes on China (1847), was “to encourage the institution of PUBLIC SERVICE COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIONS FOR ALL BRITISH SUBJECTS WITH A VIEW TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE BRITISH EXECUTIVE AND THE UNION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE” [xiv] (p. xi). Meadows feared that if the British didn’t implement a meritocratic system, the British Empire could collapse, given with what happened with the American revolution. He was so enthusiastic about the potential of the system, he personally used it to hire the best Chinese men for the British Service in Canton:

“Of course, this totally unprecedented procedure on my part raised both ridicule and reprobation among certain class of my countrymen, but I gained my object. I got better men about me than had ever been employed in the factories before; and it is worthy of note that that man, whom, esteeming him intellectually the ablest, I selected for the most important work, proved on longer acquaintance, to be morally higher than perhaps any other Chinese whose character and conduct I have had opportunities of closely and frequently observing: he never smoked opium, was a thorough believer in, and unflinching defender of the Confucian philosophy and morality, and endeavoured to square his conduct with his principles” (p. xxii).

Conclusion

Essentially, this blog is about connection. Though difference was the first thing I noticed after moving to China, the key difference was connection. For instance, with the dystopian image of China the Western media had imprinted on my mind, to be treated as an honoured guest, with every Chinese stranger, friend or student I met being willing to help me with almost anything, seemingly regardless of time, wasn’t at all what I had expected. I knew China would be different in terms of things like professors living on a university campus, but to realize that it was the connection and sense of safety I had been missing, with people looking out for me, that enabled me to begin healing, was a revelation. Although I didn’t know it at the time, it appears it might have been this empathy that would have been part of what Confucius called “Li” that had bound Zhou Society together 3100 years ago or, in modern parlance, the social practices that were, “the glue of society” and associated with the “junzi” who, first and foremost, aimed to extend their love and care beyond the family. And the respect I felt as an older man or professor would have been examples of the Confucian concept of “xiao”, or filial piety. It was the knowledge of concepts like these that were the focus of government examinations to select the best based on merit and China’s meritocracy that were seen as not only building strong families but strong communities and a strong state.

References

[i] Nisbett, R.E. (2003). The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently and Why. New York: Oxford University Press.

[ii] Mate, G. and Mate, D. (2022). The Myth of Normal: Trauma, Illness, and Healing in a Toxic Culture. New York: Avery. 

[iii] Xing Ruan, (2021). Confucius’ Courtyard: Architecture, Philosophy, and the Good Life in China – Bloomsbury.

[iv] Meng Yuanlao (1187). Trans. Dreams of Splendor of the Eastern Capital

[v] Foundations, Open Society, 2023. Open Society Barometer: Can democracy deliver?, Open Society Foundations. United States of America. Retrieved from https://coilink.org/20.500.12592/wgbbmc on 12 Sep 2024. COI: 20.500.12592/wgbbmc.

[vi] Latana, (2024). Latana Perception Index, Latana.com

[vii] Lan, Yu and Suen, Hoi K. (2005) Historical and Contemporary Exam-driven Education fever in China. KEDI Journal of Educational Policy Vol.2 №1 2005 17–33.

[viii] The American Historical Society (2024) https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/ (accessed February 1, 2024.)

[ix] Guang, X. (2014). China as a “Civilization-State”: A Historical and Comparative Interpretation. Procedia — Social and Behavioral Sciences 140: 43–47.

[x] Mate, G. and Mate, D. (2022). The Myth of Normal: Trauma, Illness, and Healing in a Toxic Culture. New York: Avery. 

[xi] Nguyen, V. (2023). (https://www.forbes.com/sites/hecparis/2023/02/02/how-chinese-strategy-ate-western-strategy-for-breakfast/ (accessed October, 2024)

[xii] Teng, Ssu-YP (1943). Chinese Influence on the Western Examination System. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 7 (4) pp. 267–312.

[xiii] Kim, P.S. and Massey, A. (2024). New development: Re-investigating the influence of China on the British civil service examination system. Public Money & Management, 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2024.2334524

[xiv] Meadows, T.T. (1856). The Chinese and Their Rebellions. London: Smith, Elder & Company 65, Cornhill.

[xv] He, J. M. (2000). China Gaokao report. Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House. (in Chinese)

[xvi] Teng, Ssu-YP (1943). Chinese Influence on the Western Examination System. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 7 (4) pp. 267–312.